Multihop wireless hotspot network [4, 14, 20, 34] 
Introduction
Wireless hotspot (WiFi) network has become commonplace in a ubiquitous networking environment. It is very popular in public places such as airport, hotel and cafes. However, the coverage of the wireless base station (BS) may be limited. In order to connect to the base station, the faraway nodes may rely on the intermediate nodes to forward their packets. This is the multihop wireless hotspot network proposed in recent literatures [4, 14, 20, 34] . It is a hybrid network consisting of infrastructure and ad-hoc networking components.
We consider a multihop hotspot network as illustrated in Figure 1 . In this architecture, a mobile client may not be able to reach the base station (BS) via single-hop direct communication. Instead, the client must rely on another node who is closer to the BS to forward its packets. Such nodes are called the relaying nodes (RN).
Compared to the traditional single-hop hotspot network where every node communicates directly to the BS, a multihop hotspot network offers a few advantages. First, it extends the coverage of the BS to a larger area, which is helpful when installing additional BS is not possible due to real property restrictions. Second, it may increase the throughput of a client who receives very bad signal from the BS, while a nearby relaying node has much better wireless signal quality. This situation is possible due to the irregular signal propagations in an environment with obstacles. Finally, by multihop forwarding, a client does not need to have subscription to the BS to use its service. This is helpful when a client roams outside its hotspot ISP's service area.
Figure 1. Multihop Wireless Hotspot Network
In this paper, we focus on providing incentive for packet forwarding in a two-hop hotspot network. 1 Since packet forwarding consumes a RN's resources such as bandwidth and energy, a selfish RN would not be willing to forward other's packets without an incentive mechanism. In this paper, we adopt the "pay for service" incentive model, i.e., the clients pay the RNs to forward their packets with monetary rewards. In human society, monetary rewards are often given for providing service. Here, packet forwarding can be considered as a "service" to others, considering the fact that the RN nodes are owned and controlled by human users.
Our focus in this paper is to determine a "fair" pricing for the packet forwarding service in this network. To this end, we model the system as a market where the pricing for packet forwarding is determined by demand and supply. The RNs compete for the clients' traffic, and clients can choose a RN who can offer a better price, similar to in a multiple-buyer multiple-seller market. However, it is different from the conventional market, because the communication scenarios in this network can be very complex, leading to different market structures.
The market structure in this network depends on the number of RNs, the communication among the RNs, and the reachability of the clients to the RNs. For example, if there is only one single RN in the network, the RN becomes a monopolist who has unique pricing power. Therefore, the RN can probe the client(s) with different prices to maximize its profit. However, if there are multiple RNs, such pricing power is rather limited. Instead, the RNs have to compete with each other by undercutting each other's price. As a result, we classify the network into four different scenarios and propose different pricing mechanisms for them (details in Section 3). In particular, we introduce a hill-climbing algorithm for a monopoly (single RN) market, and a second lowest marginal cost pricing mechanism for a market with multiple RNs and perfect reachability. We further extend these basic network scenarios to cover a situation where a client can only reach a subset of the RNs, and another situation where the RNs do not have communication among them. Under these network scenarios, we propose different pricing solutions for the market. Note that we assume the users and RNs do not collude in this paper. A summary of the scenarios and their solutions are given in Table 1 .
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: 1) we propose different market pricing mechanisms for different communication scenarios in a two-hop hotspot network; 2) we introduce a VCG-like second lowest marginal cost mechanism which guarantees truthful reporting of costs (details of VCG mechanism in Section 3.3); and 3) we demonstrate the importance of keeping communication among the RNs for a stable market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some background and concepts of a market in micro-economics. In Section 3 we discuss in detail the network scenarios and their market structures. This is followed by evaluations in Section 4. We discuss the related work in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
Background and Concepts
In this section we present backgrounds and some related concepts of a market in micro-economics.
Incentive for Packet Forwarding in MANET
Creating incentive for packet forwarding is an important problem in a multi-hop ad hoc network (MANET). There are two general approaches: game theory based approach [5, 13, 22-24, 28, 31] and credit (or micro-payment) based approach [7, 8, 35] . In game theory approach, a packet forwarding game is designed and played by all the nodes in the network. In early studies [5, [22] [23] [24] , each node is ranked with a reputation based on its packet forwarding behavior observed by other nodes in the same neighborhood. A node with bad reputation is then refused service by other nodes, and hence isolated from the network. If the cost of a bad reputation is prohibitively high, all the nodes will choose to cooperate. Recent studies [13, 28, 31] examine the forwarding dependency in the packet forwarding game. For example, in [13] the concept of a dependency graph is introduced to represent the forwarding dependency of a node to another. When there are mutual dependencies between two nodes, the packet forwarding game can be modeled as a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, where a simple "tick-fortack" strategy can be implemented to encourage mutual cooperation [13, 28, 31] . The dependency requirement means that, a node's cooperative behavior can be enforced only when its non-cooperative behavior can be "punished" by the nodes that it has previously refused to serve for. If there is no such mutual dependency, cooperation cannot take place.
In our multihop hotspot network ( Fig. 1) , forwarding dependency clearly does not exist since packet forwarding is always one-way, i.e., from the clients to the base station. Therefore, the game theory approach cannot be used in this network. As a result, we adopt the credit (micro-payment) approach where the clients pay the RNs for their forwarding service. One important problem is how to determine a "fair" pricing for packet forwarding. To this end, we model the forwarding service as a market where the market pricing is determined by the demand of the clients ("buyers") and the competition between the RNs ("sellers").
Demand Curve
The demand of a product in a market is related to its price. When the price is low, the demand is high. This relation can be captured by a function called demand curve. Fig. 2 is an example of a demand curve called the modified iso-elastic demand curve [2] . It has the following mathematical definition: where È is the price, É is the demanded quantity, and Ï is the reciprocal of the maximum price obtainable (or upperbound of price) when production tends to go to zero. In this paper, we use this demand curve to illustrate how a RN may probe the market to maximize its profit (in Section 3.2).
In our market, the price is the reward for forwarding one unit of traffic (i.e. $/Byte). The demand is measured by the amount of traffic a client is requesting (i.e. Bytes). When the price is low, the client demands more traffic.
Marginal Cost
Packet forwarding incurs a cost to the RN. Marginal cost (MC) is defined as the cost of offering the next unit of service to the clients. This may include hotspot subscription cost, computer equipment, etc. This cost may also include a variable part depending on the level of power left on the mobile device. For example, assume a user's monthly hotspot subscription fee is $50 and the monthly equipment cost is $50. The traffic that can be forwarded in a month can be estimated as: 30 days * 5 hours * 3600 seconds * 100 Kbps. Then, the fixed part of MC of forwarding one byte of data is: ½ £ ½¼ ($/Byte). At the same time, the variable part of MC may depend on the power left on the device. For example, when power is below 50%, the user may attach $1 cost to the depletion of power. The 50% power can sustain 1 hour of operation during which 3600 seconds * 100Kbps data can be sent. Then, the variable part of the MC when power is low can be estimated as: ¾ ¾ £ ½¼ ($/Byte). Therefore, the MC in this case becomes: ¿ £ ½¼ ($/Byte). If the power is even lower (e.g. 10%), the user may attach a higher cost of its depletion and hence leads to a higher MC.
Clearly, each RN has its own valuation of resources. Therefore, their MCs are likely to be different. In our market model, each RN is free to choose any MC for itself.
Monopoly and its Profit Maximization
A monopoly is defined as a market in which there is only one seller. This corresponds to the situation where there is only one RN in the network. Since the monopolist has unique pricing power in the market, it will try to find an optimal price to maximize its profit.
The monopolist can derive its optimal price as follows. Assume the marginal cost is and the market's demand curve 2 is defined in Eq. 1. The monopolist's profit function can be computed as:
If the demand curve is known, the monopolist can compute an optimal price È based on the profit function. 3 However, since the demand curve of the market is not known by the RN, a closed form computation of the optimal price is not possible. Just "ask" the clients would not be very helpful since the clients have incentive to lie about the demand curve to gain advantage.
In our model, we let the RN probe the client(s) to determine the optimal price, using a specially designed hillclimbing algorithm which is quick and accurate (details in Section 3.2).
Price Undercutting and Second Lowest MC
When there are multiple RNs in the network, they may engage in a "price war" to undercut each other. To illustrate this, let's consider a simple example with three RNs with marginal costs: ½ ¾ ¿ . Assume that initially the price is higher than ¿ , and it is gradually reduced due to price competition. When the price is reduced to ¿ ¯, the third RN quits the market because it has negative profit at this price. Likewise, the second RN quits the market when the price is reduced to ¾ ¯. At this point, since the first RN has nobody to compete against, it does not have to reduce its price any further (i.e. below ¾ ¯). Therefore, the final result of this competition is that, the RN with the lowest MC wins the competition, with a market price equal to the second lowest MC. In the example above, the first RN wins the competition with a price equal to ¾ (the second lowest MC).
To accelerate this competition, we let the RNs announce their MCs to the market, and set the final price at the second lowest MC without going through the lengthy price undercutting process. One problem with this pricing mechanism is that the RNs may "cheat" by announcing a false marginal cost. In Section 3.3, we will show that the second lowest MC pricing mechanism is able to encourage the RNs to report their marginal costs truthfully. 2 The market's demand curve is determined by the aggregate of the clients' demands under different prices. 3 A simple calculation gives È Ô Ï .
Network Scenarios and Pricing Solutions
In this section we describe in detail the network scenarios and their market structures. We then propose different pricing solutions for these markets.
Network Scenarios and Market Structures
We classify the network into four different scenarios (shown in Table 1 ). Their differences are: 1) the number of RNs in the network; 2) whether communication exists among the RNs; and 3) whether the clients can reach all RNs or only a subset of them. We relax these conditions one by one from the first scenario (S1) to the last one (S4).
Each of these scenarios leads to a different market structure. S1 depicts a simple monopoly market where the RN probes the market to maximize its profit. S2 is a simple competitive market where a client can choose service from every RN, and the RNs are aware of each other's price announcements. As mentioned earlier, we adopt the VCG-like second lowest marginal cost pricing mechanism to avoid lengthy price undercutting and to encourage truthful reporting of marginal costs. In S3, since a client can only reach a subset of the RNs, we extend the second lowest marginal cost mechanism to cover only those RNs a client can reach, and introduce a mechanism to prevent false claims of reachability by the clients. In S4, since the RNs now do not have information about each other's costs, a concurrent probing method is used by each RN to determine its optimal price. We investigate the price in equilibrium and show that in order to have a stable market, maintaining communication among the RNs is very important.
Scenario 1
In this scenario, there is only one single RN (monopolist) who probes the client(s) to maximize its profit. The probing process works as follows: 1) the RN announces a price to the clients; 2) each client reacts by controlling its packet sending rate according to its demand curve at the current price; 3) the RN measures the client's traffic and computes its profit; 4) the RN changes its price trying to obtain more profit. At a given price, a client would react honestly according to its demand curve which maximizes its satisfaction. Again, we assume the clients do not collude.
Here we propose a quick converging hill-climbing algorithm for the RN. The goal of the hill-climbing algorithm is to search an optimal price È such that the RN's profit is maximized. If the profit function È Ö Ó ǾÈµ as defined in Eq. 2 is a correct representation of the market, RN's profit should increase monotonically to its maximum and decrease monotonically after that, i.e., it has a single "peak". 4 Although it is almost impossible to determine the exact shape of the demand curve and profit function, we can reasonably assume that the profit function of the RN has a single peak. To this end, our hill-climbing algorithm is a general search algorithm for this type of function.
Our algorithm consists of two stages. The first stage performs a coarse but quick probing to locate a price region where È should belong to. The RN starts from a probing price equal to its marginal cost, and the incremental step size is always doubled each time to quickly encompass the optimal price. The first stage produces a relatively large target price region that includes the optimal price. In the second stage, the RN conducts a binary search within the target price region from the first stage to quickly narrow down the price region, by comparing the mid-point of the region with the two end-points of the region. The algorithm stops when the target price region is smaller than a pre-set accuracy threshold. Details of the algorithm and its pseudocode are given in [9] .
Scenario 2
In this scenario, there are multiple RNs in the network and they are aware of each other's price announcements. This is possible by broadcasting the announcement messages, or if not reliable enough, by BS's help to relay those messages. Note that every RN can talk to the BS.
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.5, in this market the RNs engage in a price war to undercut each other's price. The RN with the lowest MC wins the competition. The charging price is set at the price of the second lowest MC. To accelerate this competition, we let the RNs announce their MCs, and the final market price is set at the second lowest MC.
This pricing mechanism is similar in principle to the seal-bid second-price Vickrey auction [33] , where the seller collects bids from the buyers, and sells the good to the highest bidder with a price equal to the second highest bid. In this auction, the optimal strategy for each bidder is to bid her true valuation for the good. Vickrey auction is closely related to the Clark-Groove mechanism [10, 15] in allocating public goods. Together they are often known as the "VCG mechanism", which has influenced the field of mechanism design in distributed agents (e.g. [26] ).
The second lowest MC pricing mechanism can be considered as a "reversed" auction where the RNs ("sellers") compete for the clients ("buyers"). Similar to Vickrey auction, we show that the RNs have incentive to report their MCs truthfully under this pricing mechanism. Note that we assume the RNs do not collude. 4 This can be proved by the first-order derivative of the profit function:
Ï , which shows that its sign switches only once when È ½ . , the RN lost the competition, which is exactly the same outcome as if it had reported the true MC. Therefore, the RN has no incentive to over-report its MC.
In summary, a RN gains more profit by reporting its MC truthfully, no matter what the other RNs do. Therefore, the RNs have incentive to report their true MCs under this pricing mechanism.
Under this market model, only the two RNs with the lowest and the second lowest costs are needed to maintain the price. As a result, other higher cost RNs will refrain from announcing their costs in order to reduce signaling overheads. However, they should still keep monitoring the market to see whether their own costs will be needed in the future, possibly due to the departure of the current lowest cost RNs. When a RN detects that it is the only RN in the network, it will switch to monopoly mode (Scenario 1) and start to probe the client(s) to maximize its profit.
Scenario 3
Scenario 3 differs from Scenario 2 in that each client can only reach a subset of the RNs, i.e., a client may not be able to use the service of the lowest cost RN. As a result, the pricing mechanism in Scenario 2 does not apply to this scenario. Note that the RNs are still aware of each other's price announcements.
We extend the second lowest MC pricing mechanism to cover the subset reachability scenario here. That is, the second lowest MC pricing mechanism is considered only within the subset of RNs that the client can actually reach. For example, if there are five RNs in the network but a client can only reach three of them, the client has only three choices. It should go to the lowest cost RN it can reach, but pays the second lowest cost in the subset. Intuitively, this is because if the lowest cost RN refuses to serve the client, the client has to go to the second lowest cost RN. Therefore, the lowest cost RN has the "bargaining power" up to the second lowest cost, and therefore should be able to ask for that price.
However, there are two outstanding problems in this pricing mechanism. The first problem is that the client should be prevented from making false claims of its reachability to the RNs. For example, if a client can reach a certain RN but later lost contact with it, the client should not be allowed to make the claim any more. There are a number of possible solutions to this problem, such as using timestamps or sequence numbers with digital signatures. We choose to use a very simple technique. That is, when a RN announces its MC to the network, it attaches a random number with the announcement. As a result, if a client has lost contact with a RN, the RN's old announcements will become obsolete since the latest announcement has a different random number. Since the RNs can hear from each other's announcements, they are aware of the latest number. There-fore, a client cannot make false claims about its reachability to the RNs. 5 Second, what if a client can only reach a single RN? In our earlier scenarios (S1 and S2), we switch between market probing (for S1) and second lowest MC pricing (for S2) mechanisms, depending on the number of RNs in the network. Here we must adopt these two pricing mechanisms simultaneously with regard to different clients. If a client can only reach a single RN, the RN has monopolist power over the client and it can resort to price probing for that client. 6 As we have mentioned earlier, the client cannot lie about the set of RNs it can reach.
Scenario 4
In this scenario, we relax the condition that the RNs have communication among them, i.e., they are not aware of each other's price announcements. Without further information about the market, each RN has to probe the market individually to determine its optimal pricing, similar to the hillclimbing method used in Scenario 1. However, it is not clear whether concurrent probing of the market is able to lead to an equilibrium price.
To understand the dynamics of concurrent probing, consider the competition between two RNs. The first RN has cost ½ and the second has cost ¾ , with ½ ¾ . To probe the market, each RN can use a price between its MC and infinity. Since ½ ¾ , there is always a chance that the second RN can undercut the first RN's price. Then the first RN will eventually lower its price to ½ , but cannot go lower. When the second RN uses a price between ¾ and ½ , it gains the whole market with positive profit. But if it ever tries to raise its price higher than ½ , it will lose the market and has to lower its price again. In other words, ½ serves as the upper-bound for the second RN's probing price. Ideally, the second RN should set its price at ½ ¯. Using a fast and accurate hill-climbing algorithm, the second RN should arrive at an optimal price close to this value. Therefore, the net outcome is that the market price is close to the second lowest MC in equilibrium, which is similar to the pricing mechanisms in S2 and S3. However, unlike S2 and S3, this "correct" price has to be reached in a probing process.
The analysis above underscores the importance of keeping communication among the RNs. It helps the market reach equilibrium instantly and keeps the market price stable, which means better price predictability for the users. Therefore, the BS should be persuaded to act as intermediate for the RNs.
Simulations
In this section we conduct ns-2 simulations to evaluate the different pricing mechanisms in a two-hop 802.11 wireless hotspot network. There are three types of nodes in our simulation: base station (BS), relaying nodes (RN), and clients. For simplicity, we use experiment´½ Ñ Ò µ to denote a simulated network scenario where there are one BS, Ñ RNs, and Ò clients. The clients try to send constant bit rate (CBR) traffic to the BS via the RNs. The RNs broadcast their pricing announcements to the clients.
Price Probing by a Single RN
Price probing by a single RN via hill-climbing is the pricing mechanism for Scenario 1. Here we evaluate the accuracy and convergence of the algorithm by experiment (1,1,5), which means there are 1 BS, 1 RN and 5 clients. We use 0.001 as the accuracy threshold for the algorithm.
In this experiment we are interested in the accuracy and convergence of hill-climbing with multiple clients. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 2 . The RN's probing price is shown in Figure 3 . The figure clearly shows the two stages of hill-climbing: fast probing in the first stage and quick convergence in the second stage. The final price after 32 climbing steps is 1.1425, which is sufficiently close to the theoretical optimal price of 1.1359. The hill-climbing process in this experiment takes about 400 seconds. Each climbing step should be long enough for the RN to obtain a reliable measurement of the clients' traffic, which contributes to the long running time. This can be improved by starting from a price higher than the MC, or using a larger step size. However, due to the probing process, hill-climbing is best suited for a more static network environment with a fixed set of clients.
Second Lowest Marginal Cost Pricing
Second lowest marginal cost is the pricing mechanism for Scenario 2 in Section 3.3. We will show an experiment with (1,3,1) , i.e., there are three RNs competing for a client and they are aware of each other's price announcements. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 3 . The RNs arrive with staggered times: 1) during time 0s
to 220s, only ÊAE ¿ is present in the network so that it resorts to hill-climbing mechanism; 2) during time 220s to 410s, ÊAE ½ joins the network and they switch to the second lowest MC pricing mechanism where ÊAE ½ wins the competition at the MC of ÊAE ¿ ; 3) during time 410s to 640s, ÊAE ¾ joins the network so that three RNs compete for the market where ÊAE ½ wins at the MC of ÊAE ¾ ; 4) during time 640s to 830s, ÊAE ½ leaves the network so that only ÊAE ¾ and ÊAE ¿ compete with each other, where ÊAE ¾ wins at the MC of ÊAE ¿ ; 5) during time 830s to 1000s, ÊAE ¾ leaves the network so that ÊAE ¿ resumes its hill-climbing mechanism.
The pricing curves are shown in Figure 4 . Since the market price can be determined immediately using the second lowest MC mechanism, it is suitable for a dynamic network with high mobility. The pricing mechanism for Scenario 3 in Section 3.4 is similar to Scenario 2 and is omitted for brevity.
Concurrent Price Probing by Multiple RNs
Concurrent price probing is adopted when the RNs are not aware of each other's price announcements, which corresponds to Scenario 4 in Section 3.5. We will show two experiments: (1,2,1) and (1, 3, 4) . Experiment (1,2,1) has a simple topology where there are two RNs compete with each other for a single client. The parameters are shown in Table 4 . The two RNs start with staggered times: ÊAE ½ runs first (when it is a single RN in the network), and ÊAE ¾ joins later which disrupts ÊAE ½ 's probing. After that, they probe concurrently. As a comparison, we show in Figure 5 (1,3,1) .
alone, which gives a probing price of 5.9233 (theoretical optimal is 5.9161). When the two RNs probe concurrently, their prices are shown in Figure 6 . Before ÊAE ¾ joins at time 170s, ÊAE ½ probes alone which jumps the price really high. After ÊAE ¾ joins, since it has a lower MC, its initial probing price is lower, which lets it win over the client. At this point, ÊAE ½ drops its price to approximately its MC, however, it still cannot attract the client. At a certain point, for example at time 290s when ÊAE ¾ reaches ÊAE ½ 's MC, ÊAE ¾ cannot continue to climb higher because that would allow ÊAE ½ to regain the market. Then ÊAE ¾ starts to cut its price, and this competition starts over in cycles at equilibrium. The overall effect is that ÊAE ¾ has to keep a price lower than ÊAE ½ 's MC (which is the second lowest MC), but it is trying to get to that price as close as possible. Table 5 . The concurrent probing of the three RNs is shown in Figure 8 . The figure shows that when ÊAE ¾ climbs higher than ÊAE ½ 's MC (such as at time 100s), it starts to lose market and it has to cut its price, which is similar to Experiment (1,2,1). However, one important difference is that ÊAE ¾ still keeps client 6 and 7, which allows ÊAE ¾ to finish its hill-climbing approximately at time 200s. If there were no competition from ÊAE ½ , ÊAE ¾ would have ended up at a higher price. To let ÊAE ¾ finish at the highest possible price, we let ÊAE ¾ climb again after a certain period. Figure 8 shows that ÊAE ¾ eventually climbs to a price close to ÊAE ½ 's MC (which is the second lowest MC). Compared to Scenario 2 and 3, converging to the second lowest MC is much more difficult and requires a lengthy probing process, during which the wining RN loses certain profit it could have acquired. Therefore, this underscores the importance of keeping communication among the RNs. 
Summary of Results
We evaluate the pricing mechanisms in different network scenarios. In Scenario 1, we show that the proposed hillclimbing algorithm is reasonably quick and can converge very closely to the optimal value. In Scenario 2 and 3, we show that the second lowest MC pricing mechanism can determine the price instantly without the probing process. In Scenario 4, we show that a concurrent hill-climbing process can reach the second lowest MC at equilibrium, but it is beneficial to keep communications among the RNs to achieve stable pricing.
Related Work
Our work in this paper is related to a number of research areas: 1) multihop wireless hotspot network, 2) multihop cellular network, 3) cooperation in multihop ad hoc network (MANET), and 4) algorithmic mechanism design in distributed systems. Below we discuss the related work in these areas.
Multihop wireless hotspot network [4, 14, 20, 34] has been recently proposed to extend the coverage area of a base station. In [14] , an enhanced MAC layer protocol is designed to increase multihop performance by using multiple channels. In [34] , transport layer mechanisms are designed to achieve end-to-end throughput and delay assurances via service differentiation. All these studies have focused on improving system performance, but have not considered the incentive problem of packet forwarding. Therefore, our work in this paper can be considered as a pilot study in this direction.
A multihop cellular network [16, 19, 21, 27 ] is similar in concept to the multihop hotspot network. However, the base stations in a multihop cellular network are usually owned by a single operator and can be trusted. All the mobile terminals belong to the same cellular provider, and the provider can reward the terminals for multihop packet forwarding. In [16] a probabilistic charging scheme is designed to reduce the overhead of repeated micro-payments, while in [27] the charge is based on a session to further reduce the charging overhead. In [21] security mechanisms are designed to protect the authenticity of the forwarding path in order to ensure accurate accounting and payments. All these schemes require the cellular base station to act as a trusted party. However, in a spontaneous multihop hotspot network, the wireless base station does not have any business relationship with the mobile clients. The mobile clients may not be customers of the hotspot network provider. Therefore, we cannot rely on the wireless base station to collect payments. Instead, we model the multihop system as a market involving the relaying nodes, which is a more general model than the existing models for multihop cellular network.
Similar to multihop hotspot and cellular networks, cooperation in a multihop ad hoc network (MANET) is very important. The existing approaches include game theory based approach [5, 13, [22] [23] [24] 28, 31] (as discussed in Section 2.1) and credit (or micro-payment) based approach [7, 8, 35] . In [7] , a tamper-resistant hardware module is used to enforce the charging and crediting of packet forwarding, while in [35] a software-based charging scheme is designed such that cheating is not desirable. In [8] , a charging scheme is proposed based on an auction model at each router. In this paper, we focus on how to determine the fair marketing pricing, which can be combined with a charging mechanism in these studies.
Finally, the recent development of many new types of distributed systems often involves self-interested parties over the network, such as peer-to-peer resource sharing, ad hoc networks, pervasive computing, computational grids and overlay networks. As a result, the concept of truthful or strategy-proof computing has been proposed to stimulate each participant to follow a prescribed protocol without deviation via algorithmic mechanism designs (e.g. [12, 26] ). For example, a VCG-based mechanism has been utilized for MANET routing [3] . In this paper, the second lowest marginal cost pricing mechanism (in Section 3.3) is another example of using algorithmic mechanism design in a distributed system with selfish agents.
Conclusion
In this paper we focus on the packet forwarding incentive problem in a multihop wireless hotspot network. We model the system as a market where the pricing for packet forwarding is determined by demand and supply. We classify the network into four different scenarios, and propose different pricing solutions for each of them. In particular, we design a hill-climbing algorithm for a monopoly market, and introduce a VCG-like second lowest marginal cost pricing mechanism for a market with multiple relaying nodes which guarantees truthful reporting of marginal costs. We further extend the network scenarios to cover the situation where a client can only reach a subset of the relaying nodes, and another situation where the relaying nodes do not have communication among them. Our simulation results show that the pricing mechanisms are able to guide the market into an equilibrium state quickly, and that keeping communication among the relaying nodes is important to maintain a stable market. Therefore, the base station's helping to maintain communications among the set of relaying nodes is beneficial for the whole network.
As a future work, the pricing mechanisms proposed in this paper need to be integrated with a micro-payment system to enable the exchange of funds between the RNs and the clients.
